Guess quote

John Chilcot [1939-0] British

Rank: 110
Public Servant, Civil servant

Sir John Chilcot, GCB PC is a British Privy Counsellor and former civil servant. His appointment as chairman of an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and its aftermath was announced in June 2009.

Quote	Tags	Rank
We do not agree that hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability, and al-Qaeda activity in Iraq, were each explicitly identified before the invasion.		101
The U.K.'s relationship with the U.S. has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interests or judgements differ.		102
We are not a court - not a judge or jury at work - but we've tried to apply the highest possible standards of rigorous analysis to the evidence where we make a criticism.		103
We have found that the Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threat of improvised explosive devices and that delays in providing adequate medium-weight protected patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated.		104
We have concluded that the U.K. chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.		105
The people of Iraq have suffered greatly.		106
The scale of the U.K. effort in post-conflict Iraq never matched the scale of the challenge.		107
Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictator who had attacked Iraq's neighbours, repressed and killed many of his own people, and was in violation of obligations imposed by the U.N. Security Council.		108
The U.K. military role in Iraq ended a very long way from success.		109
The judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of a mass destruction - WMD - were presented with a certainty that was not justified.		110
Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated.		111
Planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate.		112
Blair overestimated his ability to influence U.S. decisions on Iraq.		113
In practice, the U.K.'s most consistent strategic objective in relation to Iraq was to reduce the level of its deployed forces.		114

The script ran 0.005 seconds.